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Kentucky's Commercial Code--
Some Initial Problems in Security
By FEmDEmuCK W. WmTESIE* and THOMAS P. LEWIS**
FoRawonD
Kentucky's first litigation requiring interpretation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code has been promptly brought to final de-
cision by the Court of Appeals in Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v.
Queenan.1 It is not surprising, perhaps, that at issue was the effect
on the Code of other statutes, both "veteran" provisions not
expressly repealed by the Code, and new provisions enacted after
the adoption of the Code but before it went into effect. It was
primarily this latter aspect of the case-the existence at this early
date of new legislation which conflicts with the new Code-which
prompted the writing of this article. It was decided, however, to
include a discussion of old as well as new legislation which creates
conflict or ambiguity when read with Code provisions. Only part
of this conflicting legislation was dealt with by the court in
Lincoln Bank. In its competition with the Code, this part emerged
second-best. Nothing less than defeat is to be expected of old
conflicting legislation, for when the Code was enacted it won out
by that fact over the older legislation. All that remains in this
area is the process of discovering and reconciling remnant am-
biguities. New legislation which conflicts with the Code because
it has not been carefully designed to "mesh" with Code provisions
presents harder problems. Here total victory for the Code and a
decent respect for the legislature are not always compatible. The
Code emerged from the Lincoln Bank litigation in a position of
dominance over the new legislation involved, and it was a
deserved dominance. But care exercised in the legislative process
is the surest guarantee for the future that the Code will not be
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
" Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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seriously weakened. The chances for its success as a Code will be
enhanced if responsible persons understand the policies and
purposes of the Code which make the dominance of its provisions
a prerequisite to its effectiveness.
INTRODUCTORY
Most Kentucky lawyers are already fully aware of the chief
underlying policies of the Uniform Commercial Code, as declared
in the Code itself:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties;
(c) to make uniform the laws among the various jurisdic-
tions.2
To accomplish these objectives the Code treats commercial trans-
actions as "a single subject of the law, notwithstanding its many
facets." This approach recognizes the fact that a single trans-
action may very well involve a contract to sell, followed by a sale,
the giving of a check or draft for part of the purchase price, and
the acceptance of a note with some form of security for the
balance of the price. The check will be cashed or negotiated and
may pass through one or more banks for collection. If the goods
are shipped or stored there may also be a bill of lading, a ware-
house receipt, or both. And where goods are bought from a
distance the entire transaction may be made pursuant to a letter
of credit.4 The Code supplants a wide variety of legislation
previously enacted piecemeal on separate subjects, such as the
laws affecting sales, negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts,
2Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102(2). The Uniform Commercial Code
[herein abbreviated UCC], adopted by the 1958 General Assembly, has been
codified by the Statute Revision Commission, as Chapter 355 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes [hereinafter abbreviated KRS], and the ten articles of the Code
have been assigned section numbers 355.1-101 through 355.10-102 inclusive.
Citations in this article will be made to the UCC section only, omitting the KRS
prefix.
$The comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute, as set out in Ky. Leg. Research
Comm'n, Pub. No. 49, Preface to Uniform Commercial Code-Analysis of Effects
on Existing Kentucky Law at xxiii (1957) (hereinafter cited LRC, Pub. No. 49].
4See Young, Scope, Purposes and Functions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 191 (1960).
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bills of lading, and the various statutes on chattel mortgages,
conditional sales, trust receipts and other forms of security. It
seeks to codify and make available in one integrated work the
entire body of law involving problems which may arise in the
handling of a commercial transaction, from start to finish.
With such extensive coverage, pervading so many branches
of the law, the job of reconciling the Code provisions with other
chapters of the Kentucky statutes is understandably a formidable
and exacting one.' The Code does contain a listing of some
statutes expressly repealed and of some other statutes not in-
tended to be repealed.( Further, there is the principle that prior
statutory provisions are repealed by implication to the extent of
their inconsistency with the Code.7 The legislative history of the
Code's adoption in Kentucky shows clear recognition that it was
impractical to attempt to list all statutes which might present
problems of partial or complete repeal and that some reconcilia-
tion and some ferreting out of inconsistent statutes would there-
fore remain to be accomplished with the passage of time.8 These
problems have been aptly described as 'knotty half-way related
5 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Pro-
ceedings of the Annual Conference 125, 127 (1952), containing remarks of
William A. Schnader, Chairman, Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the
National Conference of Commissioners.
6Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, §§ 10-102 to -104. Only those portions of the session
laws of permanent value are codified, under Kentucky compilation procedure.
Therefore Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, § 10-104 appears as KRS 355.10-102. The
specific chapters and sections repealed by Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, §§ 10-102, 10-103
are indicated in KRS as having been repealed, but these specific repealers do not
appear in KRS ch. 355 (the UCC chapter). Thus, in this instance, the section
numbers of the official draft of the UCC and the Ky. Acts do not conform to
those of KRS.
7 Crawford, Statutory Construction § 307, at 628 (1940). Section 10-103 of
the Official Draft contains a general repealer governing all inconsistent legislation.
The Kentucky version lists only the following sections: KRS 382.680, 382.690,
382.700, 382.710, 382.720. Although Kentucky thus saw fit to enact the Code
without the so-called general repealer provision contained in the recommended
draft and enacted in other jurisdictions, this omission has no real significance.
The Leg. Research Comm'n, in studying the official draft for adaptation to
enactment in Kentucky, pointed out that this provision was not needed in Kentucky
because it adds nothing to general principles of statutory construction. LRC, Pub.
No. 49,p. 396 (1957).
8 The Legislature Research Commission with respect to statutory provisions
other than those recommended for repeal in UCC § 10-102, listed a number of
other statutes which it described as follows:
The statutes in this part of the Appendix are representative of those which
are affected in varying degree by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The common feature of these statutes is that they regulate a phase that
is also touched by the Code. Some of these statutes should be repealed, some
amended and others left unchanged. (Emphasis added.) LRC, Pub. No. 49,
app. II, p. 899 (1957).
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points" between Code provisions and other statutes treating the
same subject matter." Their solution requires the courts judicially
to construe the related statutes and the Code together wherever
possible in order to achieve the objectives of the legislation.
Among those "knotty half-way related points" none seems
more baffling than the relation of the personal property security
provisions in Article 9 to the provisions in the chapter of the
general statutes relating to conveyances and encumbrances. 10
Most of the pre-existing provisions affecting chattel mortgages
were expressly repealed." On the other hand there were a few
provisions in this chapter dealing with real property mortgages,
but broad enough to affect personal property as well, which were
not repealed. 2 Further, and unfortunately, even after adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code, a number of provisions have
been added to the chapter on conveyances and encumbrances
purporting to amend the filing provisions of Article 9 of the
Code.13 These, to be discussed within, are the real troublemakers.
Article 9, which regulates all types of chattel security, fits into
the Code's comprehensive treatment of commercial transactions.
To use the language of the statute itself, section 9-102 states that
it applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property."14 It
is intended to supply a comprehensive, integrated statute where
none existed before.' 5 The prior law of chattel mortgages, con-
ditional sales, trust receipts and other security mechanisms has
developed separately as the need arose. Its growth has been
through piecemeal adaptation of these traditional devices to make
them workable in a modem industrialized society.'6 Article 9 of
the Code seeks an essential unity of chattel security devices
9 Remarks of Dee Ashley Akers, then Kentucky's statute reviser at 10th
Session, Annual Confeernee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Annual
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 116 (1658).
36 KRS ch. 382.
11KRS 882.600-30, 882.640-70, and 382.680-730 (dealing with chattel
mortgages), 882.390-420 (dealing with railroad equipment and rolling stock).12 E.g., KRS 882.110 (providing for the recording of deeds, mortgages and
other instruments), 382.290 (same), 882.020 (deeds of release), 882.270 and
382.330 to be discussed infra at pages 66-69.
13KRS 382.675 and KRS 186.195, to be discussed infra at pages 69-76.
14UCC § 9-102(a).
15 Spivack, Secured Transactions 1 (1960); Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the
Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.T. 369, 374 (1960).
16 Gilmore, Chattel Security: 1I, 57 Yale L.T. 761, 775 (1948).
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without regard to mechanism, to supplant the confusion from
rules which have grown largely by historical accident.1 7
Unquestionably the most important innovation of Article 9
is the concept of "notice filing,"18 which must be understood in
order to grasp the real accomplishment of Article 9, and to solve
problems which may arise in the construction of the filing pro-
visions of Article 9 in relation to other provisions in the statutes.
The first point of departure from previous filing practices
relates to what is filed under this notice filing concept. The
financing statement is what is filed. This financing statement is a
very simple form of notice, requiring only the limited information
set out by section 9-402-the names, addresses and signatures of
both the debtor and the secured party, and statement of the fact
that there has been or may be lending upon security of the
described type of collateral. It is to be distinguished from the
security agreement which is simply the agreement which creates
or provides for the security interest. The security agreement, in
more familiar language, might be the chattel mortgage or the
conditional sale contract. True, there is nothing to prevent the
security agreement itself from being filed if it contains the infor-
mation required in a financing statement and is signed by both
parties, but under the Code it would be filed not as such but rather
as the financing statement. 9 The filing of the financial statement
serves the function of perfecting the security interest against cer-
tain third parties (whenever such further act of perfection,
beyond the creation of the security interest, is necessary against
such third parties).2 The written security agreement, on the
other hand, serves the function of creating the security interest
between the secured party and his debtor, with the qualifications
that, in addition to the written agreement, the debtor must have
or acquire rights in the collateral and value must have been
37 Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 13
Bus. Law. 491 (1958). In order to achieve this essential unity of security devices,
Article 9 has introduced some new terminology. For example, we find "security
interest" and "secured party" instead of the familiar language of "chattel
mortgage" and "mortgagee, "condtional sale and "conditional vendor"; the
term "debtor" instead of "mortgagor or conditional vendee." See UCO § 9-105
for definitions and index of definitions.18 There is a discussion of the meaning of the innovation of notice filing in
UCC § 9-401, comment 2.
'9 UCC § 9-402, comment 1.2o UCC §§ 9-302, 9-303.
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advanced to him by the secured party before the security interest
becomes effective.2 The distinction in function between the
security agreement and financing statement is thus apparent.
The notice embraced in the Code concept of a financing state-
ment may be filed either before or after the creation of the
security interest. It is a statement designed simply to apprise
would-be lenders of the fact that the secured party is or may be
lending the debtor money upon the security of the described
collateral. The Code's flexibility, not found in the traditional
security devices,22 consists in the fact that security may be pro-
vided for future as well as present loans to the debtor and may
cover after-acquired as well as presently existing property of the
debtor, thus providing effective security for present and future
advances by a floating lien upon a shifting stock of inventory as
collateral. Furthermore, a security interest may even be extended
to the proceeds received upon disposal of the original collateral,
23
provided that for continued perfection the financing statement
must specifically include the proceeds arising from the original
collateral.24 As one authority has expressed it, the financing
statement places creditors upon notice that the debtor has given,
or in the future may give a security interest in specific assets,
leaving the details to further inquiry.2 5
Tim LINCOLN BANK CAsE,
All points at issue in the Lincoln Bank26 case required an
interpretation of the relation of the filing requirements under
Article 9 to statutory provisions outside the Code. The first two
points involved long-standing sections of the general statutes
relating to conveyances and incumbrances, providing (1) that
no deed, deed of trust or mortgage of real or personal property
is valid against certain purchasers and creditors unless "acknowl-
21 UCC § 9-204.
22 See generally Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security, 57 Yale L.J. 517-48,
(1948); Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 Yale L.T. 761-87 (1948).
23 UCC § 9-203(1) (b) facilitates creation of a security interest in proceeds
by providing: "In describing collateral the word proceeds is sufficient to cover
proceeds of any character." Further, an existing security interest would continue
in any identifiable proceeds upon any unauthorized disposition of collateral by the
debtor. UCC 9-306(2).
24UCC § 9-306(3).
2 5 Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 849 (1959).
26 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
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edged and proved according to law,"27 and (2) that no deed, deed
of trust or mortgage may be recorded unless it states the date and
the maturity of the obligations secured.28 The County Clerk for
Jefferson County had refused to permit the filing of a simple
short-form financing statement meeting the requirements of the
Code, because of failure to meet the above two requirements of
acknowledgment and statement of a maturity date. In the suit
brought by the secured party to test the validity of the clerk's
determination, the circuit court held that neither of the tvo
pre-existing statutes could have any application to a financing
statement under the Code. The Court of Appeals agreed. It was,
as the circuit court expressed it, a case of "repeal by necessary
implication" of the earlier statutes insofar as personal property
security might be involved.29
Since the Code is intended to be a comprehensive treatment
of the entire field of security transactions in personal property,
the court's decision that these statutory formalities are inapplic-
able to financing statements under the Code seems clearly correct.
The statutory language relied upon to require the acknowledg-
ment is as follows:
No deed or deed of trust or mortgage conveying a legal or
equitable title to real or personal property shall be valid against a
purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice thereof, or
against creditors, until such deed or mortgage is acknowledged
or proved according to law and lodged for record.30
Since this statute relates to conveyances and security instruments
affecting real property, as well as personal property, it is under-
standable why the General Assembly in adopting the Uniform
Commercial Code left this section unrepealed. The chapter of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes containing this section is mentioned in
the Appendix to the Legislative Research Commission study of
the Code, among the statutes "representative of those which are
affected in varying degree" and which "regulate a phase that is
also touched by the Code" requiring further checking "to delete
reference to personal property ... intended to be covered under
27XRS 382.270.
28 KRS 382.830.29 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, Opinion by Tudge Lampe, Tefferson
Cir. Ct., Ch. Branch, 2d Div., pp. 2-3 (Sept. 7, 1960).0 KRS 382.270.
1961-1
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Article 9.""1 That the acknowledgment was intended to be omit-
ted as a requirement for the financing statement under Article 9
is supported by language in the Article itself, 2 by the drafter's
comment,3 by a statement in an Opinion of the Attorney General
of Kentucky 4 and by all authoritative comment.3 5
Any other interpretation would fail to recognize the funda-
mental distinction in Article 9 between the security agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest and the financing
statement which is the notice provided for perfection of the
security interest. KRS 882.270, by referring to deeds or mortgages
which "convey" a security interest, refers to the traditional instru-
ments, which may constitute the "security agreement" under the
Code but which are not synonymous with the financing statement
under section 9-402 of the Code. The financing statement does
not convey and does not create anything; it is merely a short form
of notice of a security interest which has been or may be created.
To relieve all doubt in the mind of the statute's casual reader
without benefit of the court construction in the Lincoln Bank case,
it is recommended that the words in KRS 882.270, "or personal
property" be deleted to make clear that the financing statement
giving notice of a security interest in personal property under
Article 9 is not subject to this restriction.
Similar reasoning justifies the court's holding with respect to
the necessity for statement of a maturity date in the financing
statement. Again the court held the statute pre-dating the Code
was repealed by necessary implication. It was not necessary,
however, to hold that the earlier statute was repealed; the result
in Lincoln Bank could have been reached more simply by con-
struing KRS 382.830 to be inapplicable to security in personal
property where Article 9 applies. There is, as with the acknowl-
31 LRC, Pub. No. 49, app. II, p. 899 (1957).32 In UCC § 9-402(1) an instrument is expressly declared "sufficient" as a
"financing statement" if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an
address of the secured party from which information concerning the security
interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement describing the collateral.
33 UCC § 9-402, comment 3 reads as follows: "This section departs from the
requirements of many chattel mortgage statutes that the instrument filed be
acknowledged or witnessed or accompanied by affidavits of good faith.... They
are here abandoned in the interest of a simplified and workable filing system."34 Attorney General of Ky., OAG 60-428 (Tuly 14, 1960).
35 LRC, Pub. No. 49, p. 378 (1957) containing introductory comment to
part 4 of Article 9; Note, 47 Ky. L.J. 94 (958); Spivack, Secured Transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code 87 (1960).
[Vol. 50,
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edgment requirement, the same basic distinction between the
function of the financing statement and the security agreement.
The financing statement is not a "mortgage" or "deed of trust"
(security agreement) to which the earlier statute refers. An
important feature of notice filing is that one financing statement
may cover a running series of security transactions covering the
described type of collateral, so that there is no need to reffle "on
each of the series of transactions in a continuing arrangement
where collateral changes from day to day."3 6 This makes possible
the financing of transactions involving inventory. Requiring a
stated maturity date in the financing statement would make it
impossible for a single financing statement to cover such multiple
transactions. In fact, the financing statement need not even refer
to the particular debt.37 Furthermore, the Code in section 9-403
covers the same subject by providing for effective security for
five years where there is a failure to state the maturity date for the
financed obligations (as well as providing a time limit when the
financing statement attempts to provide for a longer period
of security, without renewal).8 KRS 382.380 could be easily
amended to leave no doubt, from a reading of the statute alone,
that it has no applicability to a filing under Article 9 of the Code,
simply by addition of the phrase "except that this section shall not
apply to the filing of financing statements under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code."
The two other statutory provisions which the Lincoln Bank
case was called upon to reconcile with the filing provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code were not "veteran" sections of the
statutes but were two provisions affecting security interests in
motor vehicles enacted by the 1960 General Assembly-before
the Code went into effect. One of these two provisions, KRS
186.195, constitutes part of the law regulating the licensing of
motor vehicles and requires the notation of liens (security in-
terests) affecting a motor vehicle on its registration receipt. The
other provision, KRS 382.675, appears in the general chapter on
36 This language is used in UCC § 9-402, comment 2, explaining the nature
and purpose of notice filing.3 7 UCC § 9-402, comment 2; Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code Without Help or Hindrance by the "Floating Lien," 15
Bus. Law. 373, 883 (1960).3 8 The court in the Lincoln Bank opinion referred to this provision. 344
S.W.2d 883, 385 (Ky. 1961).
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conveyances and incumbrances and requires registration of a
motor vehicle as a prerequisite to the recording of an instrument
conveying or reserving a security interest in a motor vehicle.
These two provisions cast a shadow of uncertainty upon the
most important Code reforms. The problems the court faced in
attempting to make these provisions work with the Code were
several, because a motor vehicle may be characterized under the
Code as "inventory," "consumer goods" or "equipment,"3 and the
potential impact of the provisions, in conjunction with the Code,
on a given transaction depends upon the Code classification of the
vehicle. Clarity will be gained, therefore, by treating the "inven-
tory" motor vehicle separately from the "consumer goods" and
"equipment" vehicle.
Inventory-New Vehicles: KRS 382.675, effective Jan. 1, 1960,
provides: "No instrument conveying or reserving a security in-
terest in a motor vehicle shall be recorded until such a vehicle
has been properly registered." If applied to new cars in a dealer's
inventory, the above legislation would strike two blows at the
dealer's business. First, new vehicles could answer as security for
loans only at the expense of their registration, a transaction that
renders the vehicle a used one in the minds of many people.40
Secondly, by requiring the registration of individual vehicles as a
prerequisite to perfection of security, "floor plan" or inventory
financing would be unavailable. If interpretation of the statute
somehow removed the obstacle, the other provision to be dis-
cussed, KRS 186.195, requiring the notation of liens affecting a
motor vehicle on its registration receipt, would necessitate security
arrangements for each new vehicle.
One of the most important objectives of the Code is to make a
dealer's shifting inventory available as collateral security in a
practicable way. Accordingly the notice-filing concept, by which
the creditor may file one financing statement to provide notice
of a series of loan transactions secured by a shifting inventory,
39 These categories are defined in UCC § 9-109(1), (2) and (4). This sec-
tion should be read in its entirety for the precise definitions involved.
40 "I am sure you can appreciate the fact that when a dealer receives a new
car from the factory, the minute he registers it, for practical purposes it ceases to
be a new car." Letter From Counsel for a national financing institution to
Authors, Sept. 25, 1960.
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was adopted in the Code.41 KRS 882.675 threatened to undermine
this Code advantage in the motor vehicle field six months before
the Code became effective. For if a creditor may safely advance
money secured by inventory only by filing a separate instrument
for each item of inventory, automobile inventory as security is
rendered unusable at worst and undesirable at best, depending
on the circumstances.
For transactions involving new inventory vehicles, there was
an easy and sensible way out for the court when it met this
problem in Lincoln Bank. New car dealers are not required by
law, apart from KRS 382.675, to register individual vehicles;
rather, provision is made for the issuance of one certificate of
registration and one or more dealer's plates to each dealer.
42
Neither the certificate nor a dealer's plate has reference to any
particular vehicle. Further, the general statute requiring the
registration of individual vehicles makes registration a condition
to the owner's use of the vehicle on the highways43-a privilege
extended to the dealer by the issuance of dealer's plates. Coupled
with the express rules of construction set out in the Code4 4 and
the clear purpose of its filing provisions, the scheme of dealer
registration, as distinguished from owner registration, made it
reasonably clear that 1_RS 382.675 was not intended to apply to
dealers. The Court of Appeals so held in Lincoln Bank and the
threat posed by KRS 382.675 to inventory financing of new motor
vehicles was averted.
Inventory-Used Motor Vehicles. Inventory financing is equal-
ly available for used and new motor vehicles under the Code.
Since used vehicles are registered when they come into the hands
of the dealer, however, KRS 382.675 did not create the problem
it did for new vehicles. But KRS 186.195, requiring the notation
of liens affecting a motor vehicle on its registration receipt,
41 See text, supra note 22. See also Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of
Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.T. 869 (1960J.4 2 KRS 186.070.
4 3 KRS 186.020.
44 UC § 1-102(1): "This act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies." UCC § 1-104: "This Act being a
general Act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter, no part of it
shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such con-
struction can be avoided."
1961]
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threatened again to nullify the single filing concept of the Code.
If such notation was to be a necessary step in the perfection of
the creditor's interest, each used vehicle in the dealer's inventory
would have to be dealt with individually.45 Although the facts of
Lincoln Bank did not raise the specific question of used cars, the
lower court concluded generally that KRS 186.195 does not apply
to cars in a dealer's inventory, new or used. Pointing out that an
inventory of vehicles is likely to include used vehicles, the Court
of Appeals addressed itself to the question and affirmed the lower
court. To apply KRS 186.195 would be incompatible with the
"floating lien" concept of the Code, the court said.46 Thus, the
provisions outside the Code affecting security interests in motor
vehicles are, by virtue of the court's holding, inapplicable to a
dealer's inventory in both new and used vehicles, and the pro-
visions of Article 9 stand as the exclusive way to perfect.
Consumer Goods and Equipment. The reasoning that led the
court to hold KRS 882.675 and 186.195 inapplicable to motor
vehicles in inventory leads inexorably to the conclusion that they
do apply (if they are to have any force at all) to motor vehicles
required to be registered prior to use on the highways by their
owners. One of the secured transactions in the Lincoln Bank case
was the sale of a car by a dealer to an individual who financed his
purchase through the bank. The county clerk refused to fie the
security agreement,47 giving as one of his reasons the failure of the
bank to present the owner's registration receipt in order that
the lien of the bank might be noted thereon in accordance with
KRS 186.195.
That an individually-owned motor vehicle subject to an out-
standing security interest is within the intendment of KRS 882.675
and 186.195 is hardly open to question. The lower court, the
Court of Appeals and all of the parties assumed this much. The
4 5 Kripke, supra note 41, at 389, points out the anomaly of noting a lien
against the dealer on a registration receipt issued in the name of another. This
would come about as the result of the practice of "jumping title," a not "uncom-
mon" practice in Kentuckv according to Kripke. The dealer takes the registration
receipt from his seller indorsed in blank and completes the indorsement with his
purchaser's name, thus "jumping title" from the original seller to the ultimate
purchaser. Another recent enactment, KRS 186.076, appears to prohibit this
practice. The sanction of revocation of the dealer's license and his dealer's plates
should be effective, if not defeated by its own severity.
46 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 387-88 (Ky. 1961).
47 The security agreement was signed by both parties to it, thus qualifying
as a financing statement under UCC § 9-402.
72 [Vol. 50,
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heart of the problem is determining the effect that should be given
KRS 186.195. Granted that liens should be noted on an owner's
registration receipt, is this necessary in order to "perfect" the
secured party's interest? If so, is such notation alone adequate,
or must the secured party also comply with the Code by filing a
financing statement? One of the parties argued ably that KRS
186.195 is an independent police measure that has no bearing
on perfection of security interests." Perfection, by this view,
would depend on Code procedures alone. The bank took a neutral
position on the question of whether the Code or KRS 186.195
provides the necessary procedures but argued strenuously that
both, viz., the notation of the lien on the registration receipt
and the filing of the lien instrument or a financing statement,
should not be required as prerequisites for -perfection.4 9 The
lien notation provision is itself silent as to effects of noncom-
pliance. The Code procedures of course include the motor
vehicle transaction, unless it falls within the exception stated
in section 9-802(3) (b): "The filing provisions of this article
do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute
of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires
indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in
such property." Section 9-302(4) adds: "A security interest in
property covered by a statute described in subsection (3) can
be perfected only by registration or filing under that statute or by
indication of the security interest on a certificate of title or a
duplicate thereof by a public official."
If the lien notation provision qualifies as a certificate of title
law within the meaning of the above Code sections, and if lan-
guage has any meaning, it is abundantly clear that such notation
would provide the exclusive means of perfection. If it does not
so qualify, it is equally clear under the Code that compliance
with Code provisions relative to perfecting interests is adequate
for that purpose. But acceptance of the first alternative is met
at once with language from other statutes, and indeed from KRS
186.195(3), which indicates filing of a "lien instrument" or financ-
ing statement was contemplated in addition to notation of liens
48 Brief for Cross-Appellant and Appellee, General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
pp. 19-31, Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).49 Brief for Appellant, Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., pp. 21-24, Lincoln Bank
& Trust Co. v. Queenan, supra note 48.
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on the registration receipt.50 This led the court to reject an
interpretation of KRS 186.195 that would qualify it as an exclusive
perfecting device under section 9-302(3). Acceptance of the
other alternative, exclusive Code perfection, seemingly leaves
KRS 186.195 without an effective sanction since no penalty for
non-compliance is provided therein. A third alternative, and
apparently the approximate solution adopted by the lower court,
is to require dual perfection. It is difficult, if possible at all, to
reconcile this solution with the scheme of the Code evidenced
by section 9-302.
Judge Palmore, writing for the court, aptly described the
question raised by KRS 186.195 in this context as the most
"treacherous" one.5' But he then deftly eluded both Scylla and
Charybdis: although perfection of a security interest in a regis-
tered vehicle is accomplished by filing the financing statement
required by the Code, the county clerk may refuse to fie a
financing statement in the absence of compliance with KRS
186.195. The court thus made the lien notation statute effectively
enforceable without trenching upon the preserve of the Code
insofar as the theory of perfection is concerned. This may make a
difference in an isolated case;52 in the vast majority of transactions
5 0 The court cited three provisions containing such language: KRS 382.740,
"The lien instrument referred to in... 186.195 shall be filed in the same manner
as financing statements are required to be filed by KIRS Chapter 355."; KRS
382.770, "If the property intended as collateral is consumer goods . . . at the time
the financing statement required by KIRS 355.9-402 is filed, and if the property is
an automobile ... "; KRS 186.195(8), "Whenever a lien instrument affecting a
motor vehicle is presented to a county clerk for recording in any county other than
the one in which the motor vehicle is registered.. . ." Lincoln Bank & Trust Co.
v. Queenan, 844 S.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Ky. 1961).
51 Id. at 387.
52If a financing statement covering an automobile is recorded without nota-
tion of the security interest on the owner's registration receipt, the secured party
nevertheless will be protected since notation does not affect "perfection" as such.
Whether this situation can arise, absent neglect by a county clerk, is not dear.
Suppose A advances money to B laundry entering into a security agreement which
covers certain existing equipment of B. Because the equipment is not adequate
security for the amount of the loan the agreement provides that A shall have a
security interest in all after-acquired equipment of B. A files the security agree-
ment. Subsequently B acquires a new delivery truck which he registers in his own
name without indication of any security interest in A. Under UCC § 9-204, A's
security interest "attaches" at the time B acquires rights in the delivery truck.
Having filed a financing statement earlier, his security interest is "perfected" at
the time his interest attaches." UCC § 9-303(1). KRS 382.770 requiring
financing statements to include the serial number of any motor vehicle intended
as collateral, applies only to "consumer goods." Here then is a situation in which
notation of an outstanding security interest on the owner's registration receipt may
not occur. Since such notation is not a prerequisite of "perfection," the creditor's
(Footnote continued on next page)
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secured by registered motor vehicles there is no escaping the fact
that perfection of interests now involves the steps outlined in KRS
186.195 in addition to Code filing.
Preserving the effectiveness of the statute by making it an
integral part of the perfection process recognizes the "manifest
desire" of the legislature, the court said. Where the legislature
made this desire manifest, unless it simply follows from the
scheme of things, is not clear. The court itself pointed out that
nothing in the statute explains the effects, if any, of noncom-
pliance, or provides any explicit means of enforcing its mandatory
terminology. The other statute, KRS 882.675, may partially fill
the gap, but a very sympathetic interpretation to make it work
with the Code is necessary. It refuses recordation of any "instru-
ment conveying or reserving a security interest in a motor vehicle"
until the vehicle is "properly registered." The purpose which is
clear would warrant interpreting "instrument" to include a
financing statement although the latter neither conveys nor re-
serves anything. Then, "properly registered" can be interpreted
to require the notation of any outstanding liens on the registration
receipt for a new car. This leaves still in doubt the source of the
clerk's power to refuse recordation of a financing statement cover-
ing a used car until the security interest is noted on the registra-
tion receipt.
Surely judge Palmore was justified in describing the problem
as a "treacherous" one. The only solution that would not involve
the court in either ignoring or supplying legislative text is the
one which treats K1RS 186.195 as an independent police measure
having no bearing on or connection with perfection of interests.
And this solution would most likely defeat the obvious purpose
of the legislature to provide greater protection to the public by
creating a "portable recording system which travels with the
vehicle."15  It is unfortunate that this laudable object can be
achieved in this state only by localizing it for fee purposes and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
interest is valid even against those dealing on the basis of information reflected by
the owner's registration receipt. It is arguable that KRS 382.675 makes impossible
the inclusion of non-inventory motor vehicles in an after-acquired-property clause.
However, since a financing statement "conveys" and "reserves" nothing, such a
result would be questionable.
53 This phrase was used to describe the effect of certificate of title laws in
Comment, 70 Yale L.T. 995, 996 (1961).
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then superimposing it on an existing, local, fee-scheduled filing
process. No one, to the best of our knowledge, has ever presented
a reasoned argument favoring two recording schemes operating
side by side for perfection of interests. If a complete and reason-
able certificate of title law cannot be passed, KRS 186.195
should be repealed, or it should be amended so as to provide the
exclusive method for perfecting security interests in registered
non-inventory vehicles. Considering the nature of the property,
careful amendment may be the more satisfactory alternative.
ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST IN MOTOR VEHICLES
The motor vehicle statutes contain provisions covering the
same subject matter as the Code concerning not only the initial
perfection but also the requirements for the assignment of security
interests. The Lincoln Bank litigation did not raise the problems
which these assignment provisions create.
The Code provisions contemplate permissive filing of the as-
signment of a perfected security interest. Section 9-405 provides
that a secured party may make his assignment of record either by
indorsement on the financing statement or by the filing of a
separate written statement of assignment referring to the financing
statement.55 From the viewpoint of the original secured party,
one purpose in having the assignment noted of record is that
inquiries concerning the transaction may thereafter be addressed
not to him but to the assignee who becomes the secured party of
54 Kentucky is one of eleven states which have no certificate of title law.
Thirty-nine other states and the District of Columbia have such legislation.
Id. at 996 nn. 10-11. In addition to the inconveniences caused in commercial
transactions by this lack of adequate laws, Kentucky is one of the few "dumping
grounds" or at least "conduits" for stolen automobiles. For the story of the recent
break up of a huge auto-theft ring that made Kentucky laws part of its operation
see Louisville Courier-Journal, Tune 18, 1961, § 4, p. 1. Some background con-
cerning the efforts for and resistance to passage of a certificate of title law in the
state is also developed. The drama of Kentucky's unwitting part in the theft of
motor vehicles on a large scale may provide the impetus necessary for bold legisla-
tive action. A comprehensive certificate of title law is clearly more desirable than
a patchwork attempt to accomplish the same objectives without disturbing any of
the treasured procedures of the past.
55 UCC § 1-102(2). Apparently the filing of notice of assignment by indica-
tion of such upon the financing statement itself is designed for cases in which
there is an assignment to a financing company prior to the filing of the financing
statement, whereas filing the assignment by separate instrument would be useful
for subsequent assignments. See the form for annexing assignment to financing




record.5 Such filing of the assignment, however, is not required
as a condition of continuing the perfected status of the security
interest against the original debtor and his creditors and trans-
ferees.5 7 The assignment of the security interest under the Code
may also be made effective against third parties claiming under
the assignor (usually the original secured seller) by simply taking
possession of the chattel paper under section 9-808. These Code
provisions seem adequate enough to govern parties' rights under
assignments.
The 1960 motor vehicle legislation, however, requires that an
assignment shall be noted upon the registration receipt by the
secured party. In the case of an assignment subsequent to the
initial registration, a court could hold notation of the assignment
prerequisite to presentation of the assignment for filing under the
same reasoning as in the Lincoln Bank case requiring lien notation
prerequisite to filing of financing statement. The filing of the
assignment, however, may not be as vital as the filing of the
financing statement, since the Code continues the perfected status
of the filed security interest without filing of the assignment.
One of the several amendments, added to KRS 186.195 by
separate bills of the legislature in 1960,58 on first blush makes
filing of the statement of assignment mandatory. The new lan-
guage in KRS 186.195(4) (b) is as follows:
(b) The secured party shall ifie a statement of assignment
or termination which statements [sic] shall be governed by
the provisions of KRS 355.9-404 and 355.9-405 and any other
applicable provision of law, and which must be filed within
80 days of the assignment or discharge of the security
interests.
The fact that the title registration legislation was enacted
later than the Code and the terminology of its requirement for
filing the assignment is in mandatory form constitutes some basis
56 See the drafter's comment to UCC § 9-405 in the 1958 Official Text of the
Code.
57UCC § 9-302(2).
5s Two bills, one originating in the House and the other in the Senate, were
both enacted by the legislature. The House bill (H.B. 69) was enacted as Ky. Acts
1960, ch. 10, effective July 1, 1960, and the Senate bill (S.B. 41) was enacted as
Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 37, effective Tune 16, 1960. It is paragraph (3) (b) of the
House bill which was compiled in KRS 186.195(4) (b). This provision had no
substantive equivalent in the Senate bill (Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 37).
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for saying that the mandatory feature of the motor vehicle law
controls over permissive filing under the Code. Nevertheless XRS
186.195 is itself ambiguous, in effect requiring compliance with a
provision that, being permissive, demands no compliance. This
indicates a misunderstanding of the Code requirements rather
than a clear intention to modify the Code. In view of the Code
provision that it is not to be assumed that modification of its
provisions is intended without clear legislative intention to do so,
this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the Code provision.
Further, there is nothing in KRS 186.195(4) (b) to make man-
datory filing a step for perfection of the assignment. Since the
court held that the other mandatory provisions of KRS 186.195
were effective only insofar as the clerk can enforce the provisions
as a condition precedent to filing of the financing statement, it
might as readily be held that the provision is not enforceable
except where an assignment is sought to be filed or indorsed on
the financing statement, there being no other provision for en-
forcement of the provision.
In the retail automobile financing field it is typical for the
dealer to assign his security interest in the vehicle to a finance
company contemporaneously with the sale under a prearranged
plan whereby the finance company advances the money and takes
the chattel paper of the dealer. Thus the finance company is
initially the real secured party. The question therefore arises
under KRS 186.195(4) whether the security interest to be noted
on the registration receipt must be that of the selling dealer or
whether it may be that of the financing institution to whom the
dealer assigns the security interest. It should be possible to note
the name of the finance company as the assignee upon the
registration receipt. KRS 186.195(4) is not clear on this point.
This section should be repealed and a specific provision sub-
stituted permitting either the issue of the registration receipt
with the assignee financing institution named as the holder of the
security interest or an indorsement of the assignment on the
registration receipt.
Of even more importance than how to perfect an assignment
of a security interest against parties holding under the debtor is
the question of perfection of an assignment against third party
claimants of the assignor, the selling dealer. When the assignee
[Vol. 50,
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takes possession of the chattel paper the Code gives protection
against third party claimants holding under the assignor. One
further provision, found in the Kentucky "Motor Vehicle Retail
Installment Sales Act," has a bearing. KRS 190.100 provides that
no filing of the assignment shall be necessary for its validity "as
against creditors, subsequent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees
and lien claimants" of the original seller. This provision seems
entirely consistent with the Code. There is, however, the question
of possible conflict of KRS 190.100 with the subsequently enacted
KRS 186.195(4) which seems to provide mandatory filing of the
assignment.
Again, it is recommended that the latter provision be repealed
and a provision consistent with the Code be substituted.
Misc=rANous PROBLEms DEsEzvNG LEGISLATi E ATrENTION
The subject matter of the Lincoln Bank litigation by no means
included all the statutory provisions affecting the formal require-
ments for perfection of a security interest. Some of these were
enacted after passage of the Code 9 in the form of amendments
thereto, although they are found scattered through other portions
of the statutes instead of in the appropriate Code section.
Here are some examples of piecemeal tampering with the
Codes filing provisions. In 1960 the General Assembly amended
KRS 382.770 to add a requirement that the financing statement
under the Uniform Commercial Code contain, in addition to the
information required by the Code provision (section 9-402), the
serial number of each item of collateral if the property is consumer
goods60 and is of a type "normally carrying a serial number."6'
If the collateral is an automobile or motor truck the motor number
or identification number as well as the make, model, and year
must also be given. The hidden trap for the unwary in such a
provision lies in the fact that there are many items other than
motor vehicles which do in fact contain serial numbers, even
though the type of property involved may not be generally known
to carry serial numbers. For example, there are many items of
59 The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted on March 28, 1958 (Ky. Acts
1958, ch. 77), to become effective Tuly 1, 1960.
60The consumer goods referred to is defined in UCC § 9-109(1).61 KRS 382.770.
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farm machinery, small industrial tools, wall cabinets, sinks, dis-
posals, sanders, and other articles which may have serial numbers
although the numbers are little used or known.
Another 1960 amendment to the chapter on conveyances and
encumbrances provides that whenever the indebtedness secured
is $200 or more that fact shall be so stated on the financing
statement.!2 Such a provision seems to have no legitimate purpose
in modem financing, especially in the field of inventory financing
where a floating lien upon shifting stocks of merchandise may be
created to secure varying amounts of present and future indebted-
ness. The historical reason for this type provision may be traced
to the desire to protect the debtor and third parties in the simplest
form of chattel mortgage. Both this provision and the statute
providing the serial number requirement should be repealed.
Another 1960 provision in the same general category requires
that a statement required to identify a financing statement by file
number under Article 9 must also identify the financing statement
by date.63 This type provision affects Article 9 and belongs there
instead of in chapter 382. It could be repealed without effect,
since the same thing seems to be accomplished by section 9-403
(3), which calls for notation of the date and hour of filing. Still
another such provision"4 states that the sending of a financing
statement by the county clerk shall be sufficient if sent to the last
known address of the party entitled to receive this statement.
Again, this provision belongs in Article 9.
Still another example of this hodgepodge of added legislation
affects the termination statement provided by the Code. The new
provision contains a mandatory requirement that the secured
party send to the clerk a "termination statement" within thirty
days after he no longer claims a security interest in the collateral.
This need be done by the secured party only when the security
transaction has actually terminated, which means that no out-
standing obligation and no commitment to make future advances
remain. The purpose of the mandatory requirement is to prevent
the record from indicating that the debtor's collateral is tied up






however, inconsistent with the Code provision, section 9-404,
which does not require a termination statement unless demanded
by the debtor, after which demand the termination statement
must be provided within ten days. By limiting the duration of the
financing statement to five years, the Code seems to protect the
debtor adequately against having the property given as security
tied up of record indefinitely. There are minor differences in the
penalties provided by these two parallel statutes.0 5 One further
difference between section 9-404 and KRS 382.790 is interesting.
Section 9-404 provides a fee of fifty cents for filing a termination
statement, whereas, KRS 382.790 now provides seventy-five cents.
This, however, might better have been provided by amendment
of section 9-404 and the statute listing the county clerk's fees.
Several other items of needed patchwork stem from the fact
that Kentucky, considering the Code in early 1958, adopted the
1957 draft without the 1958 changes in wording later recom-
mended by the drafters. These changes have now been in-
corporated into the Pennsylvania version and by all other states
which have subsequently adopted the Code. An important dif-
ference is in regard to the time for perfection of a purchase money
security interest in order for it to have priority over a prior filed
financial statement covering the same kind of collateral. The
Kentucky draft gives the purchase money security interest priority
if it "is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the
collateral" whereas the 1958 draft allows an additional ten days
after the debtor gets possession. The key words "or within ten
days thereafter" should be added to section 9-312(4) at the next
session of the legislature."0 Against a transferee in bulk or a lien
creditor, the holder of the purchase money interest is allowed ten
days after the debtor comes into possession for perfection under
the 1958 version, but the Kentucky version allows ten days after
value is given, again following the 1957 language. 67 This variation,
too, should be corrected to conform with the 1958 draft, and
65 KRS 882.790. The penalty for failure to issue the termination statement
under KRS 382.790 within 30 days is $25 and any loss caused to the debtor; the
penalty under UCC § 9-304 for failure to issue the termination statement within
10 days after demand is $100 and any loss caused to the debtor.
66 For further discussion of the importance of this error, see Kripke, supra
note 41, at 384; Hatton, Security Interests under the Uniform Commercial Code,
25 Ky. S.B.J. 105, 110 (1961).
67 UCC § 9-301(2).
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minor improvements in wording in several other sections of
Article 9 should be made.6 8
In Kentucky there may remain at least one unanswered
question with respect to the proper place for filing to perfect a
security interest. It will be recalled that Kentucky adopted
neither the alternative of central state-wide filing alone nor the
combination of central plus local filing permitted under section
9-401 of the Code. Kentucky instead provided only local filing
in the county clerk's office for all situations. The double filing
alternative seemed to offer none of the advantages of either local
or central filing, and Kentucky had local conditions justifying
adoption of local filing.6 9 Kentucky therefore designated the
county of the debtor's residence, or the county where the goods
are kept if the debtor is not a resident of Kentucky,70 as the proper
place to file, and in order to continue local filing exclusively
omitted the catch-all provision in subsection c, "In all other cases,
in the office of the Secretary of State."71 The question has been
raised whether this failure to provide for other cases leaves a
serious gap in the filing provision. Notice that the Kentucky
version is silent where the collateral is intangible property or
property other than "goods" of a non-resident debtor. Of course
there is no difficulty if the debtor is a Kentucky resident irrespec-
tive of the tangible or intangible nature of the collateral, for Miing
is properly made in the county of the debtor's residence. Nor
does any problem arise when the debtor is non-resident if the col-
lateral is goods within Kentucky, for then filing is properly made
where the goods are located. 72 But if the property is intangibles
owned by a non-resident debtor, serious questions arise.73 Assum-
ing as a matter of conflict of laws classification that Kentucky law
is inapplicable, then of course the provisions governing filing in
the state where the non-resident debtor resides would apply.
68 See the 1958 changes adding new subsection (4) to UCC § 9-207, and
changes in wording in UCC §§ 9-312(3) (b) and 9-501(3).
69 To the effect that Kentucky wisely adopted only local filing in a manner
which conforms to past Kentucky experience as opposed to central filing alone
or the combination of central and local filing under the second alternative in the
1958 Official Text, § 9-401(1), optional para. (c), see Kripke, supra note 41,
at 385.
7oUCC § 9-401(1)(a).71 UCC § 9-401(1 )( c).72 UCC § 9-401(1) (a).
7 3 Hatton, Security Interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Ky.
S.B.T. 105, 110 (1961).
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Assuming as a matter of conflict of laws classification that the
Kentucky version of the Code is the applicable law governing
filing,7 4 the omission of the catch-all governing "all other cases"
would seem to result in a failure to provide a place to file. The
filing provisions which necessarily govern are again those of the
state of the debtor's residence.75 This other state might provide
for local filing in the county of the debtor's residence, or it might
provide instead for some form of central filing for the type trans-
action involved. In either case, it is the filing provisions in that
state which determine type of filing, the place of filing and the
mechanics of filing.
74 UCC § 1-103 states the principle so as to permit the Code state to apply
the Code to transactions having "an appropriate relation to this state" and also
allows freedom of choice of the applicable law by the parties if that state has a
"reasonable relation" to the transaction. UCC § 9-103 provides some specific tests
for determination of the applicable filing law for accounts, contract rights and
general intangibles and also for equipment and inventory of a type (e.g., rolling
stock) normally used in more than one jurisdiction. If the collateral is accounts or
contract rights and the assignor-debtor has its office for keeping the records in
Kentucky, then "this Article" is made to apply; otherwise the law of the jurisdic-
tion where that office is located governs. "This Article," as adopted in the Ken-
tucky version, would seem to make the proper place for filing the county of the
office where the assignor-debtor's records are kept provided that "office" may be
construed to have the same meaning as "debtor's residence within the language
of UCC § 9-401 (1) (a), which specifies the proper place to file. If the collateral
is general intangibles or equipment or inventory of a type normally used in more
than one state and the debtor's chief place of business is in Kentucky, then Article
9 is made to apply. Again, the Kentucky version of the provision for place of filinr
in UCC § 9-401 (1) (a) provides an answer, but only if "chief place of business"
is considered equivalent in meaning to "debtor's residence" as used in the latter
provision.
On the other hand if the chief place of business in the case of general
intangibles or property normally used in more than one jurisdiction happens to be
out of Kentucky, then UCC § 9-103(1) and (2) provides that the governing law.
including the conflict of laws rules, shall be that of the place where the chief
place of business is located. This should he satisfactory in most instances because
most jurisdictions will provide a system of either local or central filing to govern.
If, however, the conflict of laws principles of the other state should refer the matter
back to Kentucky for the applicable law. there may be difficulty in view of the
incompleteness of Kentucky's version of UCC § 9-401. Omission of the catch-all
phrase "in all other cases in the office of the [Secretary of State]," or of some sub-
stitute phrase to take care of the special Kentucky situation, means a gap in the
legislative Trovision so that there is simply no place to file. It might he that for
rolling stock, or similar property normally kent in more than one Jurisdiction. the
county where inventory or equipment is temporarily locsted would be considered
the proper county under the language. "county where the goods are kept." The
comments under UCC § 9-103 in several places admit that in multistate enterprises
there may be doubtful situations where it'may be very difficult to resolve the ques-
tion of where to file between Feveral possible places. In case the statutory formula
provided leaves such doubt the drafters suaaest as one solution that the secured
narty Mile in each of the several places (see Official Comments 2 & 3 for more com-
plete discussion).
75 The conclusion with regard to non-resident debtors of course would apply
to an out-of-state corporation, with respect to which the governing filling pro-




Of far greater importance than any of the specific problems
discussed in this article are the lawmaking habits they disclose.
It was inevitable that questions of interpretation would be raised
by certain unrepealed "veteran" legislation which is not entirely
consistent with the Code. Many more such conflicts undoubtedly
lurk in the statutes and their existence will not be realized until
uncovered by attempts to solve concrete problems. There is every
reason to believe that the court will meet the inevitable tasks of
reconciliation as they arise with great intelligence and under-
standing. Not inevitable in any sense, however, is the creation of
additional uncertainty by the casual introduction and passage of
legislation touching subjects within the cognizance of the Code.
The purpose of the Code to "simplify, clarify and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions" and to "make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions" cannot be over-empha-
sized. Simplicity, clarity and uniformity can only be achieved in
the field of commercial law by a Code that is permitted to flfil
its designed function as a comprehensive enactment. It is cause
for alarm when the legislature enacts seven or eight statutes,
scattered about in various chapters of the statute book, all of
which conflict with or modify code provisions, even before the
Code takes effect.
In a complex society a Code that seeks simplicity will never-
theless appear quite complex, taken as a whole, if it achieves the
flexibility consonant with justice for the parties to widely varying
transactions. Mastering the Code alone is a formidable task for
the attorney who must handle commercial problems along with
hundreds of other non-commercial legal problems in his day-to-
day practice. If he cannot depend on the comprehensiveness of
the Code, if he must ever be alert for a conflicting or modifying
statute tucked away in another chapter and having a very uncer-
tain meaning because its language is not of the same species as
that of the Code, his ability to provide adequate counsel to the
public-his clients-is diminished. Law will be complex despite
all our efforts to keep it simple. Our society is not a simple one
and law, responding to the needs of society, will reflect its com-
plexities. But to manufacture complexity unnecessarily is a great
evil that should be fought vigorously.
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1961] KIqvTU o's ColvncMa=CTA CODE 85
The Court of Appeals can be, but should not often have to be,
depended upon to rescue the Code, at the same time saving as
much as possible of a conflicting legislative program. A great deal
is nevertheless lost in the process. The Lincoln Bank case could
do nothing to remedy the uncertainty which prevailed during the
year between the effective date of the questioned legislation and
the issuance of the opinion. And in the future the opinion can
serve to clarify its problems only after the several problems have
been isolated and the Lincoln Bank case located by the attorney
or party concerned. This is a normal process in the law's growth
and the discernment of that growth. It is, however, a process that
is born of necessity, that springs from our institutions. It is only
the unnecessary multiplication of the tasks involved in this process
that is to be condemned. To plead that the tendency toward such
multiplication be abandoned by the legislature has been the
primary purpose of this article.
